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I. Introduction 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the 
loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3,2003. Foam liberated fitom the 
External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing 
the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous 
issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any 
one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery’s recent return to 
flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of “erosion” of foam and the risk of future 
undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this 
problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with 
the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. 
The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the 
entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as 
some sort of sizehime limited “ablator.” This step is paramount to accepting the CAB 
recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the 
fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant 
effort has been expended to identify “root cause” of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly 
(FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, 
only a most “probable cause” can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched 
corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials 
characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities.’ Also, 
foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons 
difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such 
naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a 
negative margin range is not consistently achieved. 
Looking at the ET’S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., “glass 
half full” mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as 
reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements 
philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements 
for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle’s case, reasonableness is established by 
exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and 
programmatic constraints. 
A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the 
hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper 
will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline 
steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an 
approach no matter what becomes of the next flight’s actual debris field lest we fall back 
into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the 
other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the 
Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy off- 
ramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and 
increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission. 
11. Materials & Mechanistic Behavior 
The Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) is covered with multiple urethane foams both 
sprayable and pourable. They belong to basically two categories of urethane foams, 
polyurethane and polyurethane isocyanurate (PUIR) foams. The foam “systems” are 
comprised of parts A & B from raw materials originating from multiple sources. Part A is 
the isocyanate and Part B is the polyol, catalysts, surfactants and the blowing agent. The 
Parts A & B are then proportionately sprayed or “poured” at a specified ration onto the 
aluminum substrate of the ET and in an exothermic reaction form a protective closed cell 
foam insulation structure. The polyurethane foams such as PDL-1034, a polyether and 
BX-265, polyester, are utilized primarily in manually applied regions of the tank such as 
protuberance regions, ramps, collars and other complex geometric closeout locations. 
The PUR foams such as NCFI (North Carolina Foam Industries) 24-57 and 24-124 
utilize an excess of isocyanate or higher isocyanate index (Part A/B ratio) to create foams 
having better thermal stability than the polyurethane foams. The NCFI 24-57 and 24-124 
are utilized on the acreage regions of the tank primarily applied by automated spraying 
techniques with controlled conditions. 
Polyurethanes contain carbamate groups, -NHCOO-, also referred to as urethane groups, 
in their backbone structure.2 In general, urethane foams encompass both polyurethane 
and PUR foams formed in the reaction of an isocyanate with a macroglycol, a so-called 
poly01 based on polyethers, polyesters, or a combination of both. The stiffness associated 
with these foamed polymers is a product of the chemistry of the materials. In the realm 
of the solid state physicist and quantum chemist, the stiffness of these highly cross linked 
covalent bonded polymers can be estimated based on their chemical structure. Higher 
strength foams can be realized through higher functional polymeric isocyanates and 
higher functional polyols. These increase the covalent cross link density and results in an 
increase in the Young’s modulus for the resultant foam. Additionally, cross linking is 
achieved through secondary reactions such as the trimerization of part of the isocyanate 
groups during formation of PUR foams. However, there are many trade-offs with 
regards to the final chosen chemistry. Catalysts are added to overcome acid impurities, 
enhance secondary linkage and controlbalance the reactivity of the system. Surfactants 
are added to facilitate the formation of small bubbles necessary for a fine cell structure. 
Blowing agents have presented great challenges for NASA and the industry having to 
pursue non-CFC-l l versions. Alternative blowing agents such as HCFC’s and HFC’s 
have h-values (m’W/m‘K) of about 19.5 whereas CFC-11 blown foams have a value of 
18.0 making the alternatives less efficient in their insulation performance due to the fact 
that the blowing agent accounts for 97% by volume of gas in these low density 
materials.2 For instance, the PDL-1034 formulation utilizes a HCFC-141b and a little 
water which generates carbon dioxide as part of the blowing agent. Water affects the 
flow properties during the reaction period wherein the chemicals move from the low 
viscosity state of the original liquid mixtures to the polymerized foam. The configuration 
of the substrate can hinder the effective flow from initial “creaming” to the end of the rise 
during the foam expansion process and determines whether areas will be automatically 
sprayed, manually sprayed or poured. Similar to good chemistry, good flow is necessary 
to produce as close to an isotropic TPS material as possible. 
Closed cell urethane foams are a large family of flexible and rigid products the result of a 
reactive two part process wherein a urethane based poly01 is combined with a foaming or 
“blowing” agent to create a cellular solid at room temperature. The ratio of reactive 
components, the constituency of the base materials, temperature, humidity, molding, 
pouring, spraying and many other processing techniques vary greatly. However, these 
conditions have a great impact on the final material properties. The cell wall thickness of 
typical rigid polyurethane foam is fkom 3pm at cell faces to 30pm at cell edges.’ From 
one of the author’s recent test samples, Figure 1 is a photomicrograph view of typical 
polyurethane foam at the cell level. 
Typically, the constituencies of closed cells in urethane foams is more than 90% 
throughout the foam material, but note the presence of voids in Figure 1. Ideally, a foam 
cell structure exhibiting uniform spherical cell shapes, negligible voids and consistent cell 
wall thickness would provide a reliable engineering material. However, PUIR and 
polyurethane foams in practice exhibit reaction directional cell elongation, void 
agglomeration and variable cell wall thickness. These characteristics produce a foam 
structure of higher material mechanical properties in the foaming reaction rise direction 
than the transverse direction, higher gas pressures during ascent in “large” void locations 
and wide variances in material mechanical properties. On the ET, the thickness is 
approximately 1” throughout the acreage with thicker foam in and around protuberances, 
ramps and transitions. 
The study of the erosion of polyurethane foam under dynamic aerospace environments 
dates back to the Saturn program when engineers were working on a replacement for the 
cumbersome external insulation system for the S-I1 stage. Even though the in-line 
configuration posed little risk for loss of life, there was rigorous discipline assuring 
“insulation must remain structurally intact”7 to meet functional requirements of heat leak 
and boil-off. This stepwise approach in clearly establishing requirements and executing a 
comprehensive insulation development program led to the foam technologies 
successhlly inserted on Saturn and parent of today’s foam systems. 
The mechanistic findings of these earlier studies are still applicable today: _ _  
Foam not processed properly, especially with respect to mix&e ratio 
(NCO/OH), showed evidence of spalling with rapid deteri~ration.~ 
Materials properties evaluations (e.g., physical, chemical & mechanical 
properties) are needed at the component level prior to mixing, just after 
mixing and the cured foam at beginninglend of design life. 
Heat sink effects drawing heat away from the foaming process at a rate 
sufficient to prevent boiling of the blowing agent can lead to a high density 
foam layer at the foam surface interfa~e.~ 
Low density polyurethane foams degrade rapidly when exposed to the 
external environment attributable primarily to ultraviolet (UV) exposure. 
Moisture alone does not result in any significant foam degradation  effect^.^ 
Wind tunnel testing at room temperatures reveal no damage to foam panels at 
dynamic pressures 40% greater than Saturn S-I1 stage maximum design values 
(e.g., @ multiple protuberances) and no loss in intentionally de-bonded foam 
plugs with coatings a~p l i ed .~  
Thermal vacuum tests reveal BX-250 foam cell walls beginning to burst at 
X-15 flight tests closely approximating predicted Saturn S-I1 combined 
environment design values show foam erosion in protuberance influenced 
regions of approximately double that of lower temperature areas.’ 
-250°F.’ 
These extensive studies and testing provided great insight into how the foam fails and 
other forensic observations. Certainly, these forensic observations and studies do not 
address the geographical dispersion of ET failures within a time dependent framework, 
but serve as a benchmark for understanding failure modes. The initiating effect during 
ascent triggering foam failure is the increase in temperature during aerodynamic heating. 
This increase in temperature decreases the strength of the foam cell walls while 
increasing the internal gas pressure until rupture of the cell wall occurs. These particles 
enter the boundary layer possibly creating downstream damage. In any case, the erosion 
accelerates exposing more irregular surfaces to aerodynamic viscous forces with an 
unpredictable path of degradation. It is conjectured that the loss in cell wall strength due 
to increased temperatures is irreversible and foam erosion continues well beyond 
maximum aerodynamic shear possibly more a function of thermal dissipation at that 
point.5 
111. Integrated Process 
The importance of detailed foam chemical information has been reported by NASA from 
the time of its initial use. In August 1988, Harvey, et.al., report, “A major defect in all of 
the systems (foam) according to NASA is the lack of detailed chemical information.’’2 
This theme has been repeated throughout the literature researched, as well as, supplier 
problems, quality control and inspection. Establishing realistic requirements for ET foam 
loss that can be verified and validated necessitates stringent process controls, materials 
quality verification, acceptance testing and rigorous certifications. Today, these 
problems may have been overcome and are reduced to an examination of when such 
evaluations are conducted, the sample frequency and the event driven nature of their 
conduct. 
The comprehensive foam reduction strategy presented in this paper is a multi-tiered 
approach aimed at short and long term solutions with ET debris limitation requirements 
driven by the physical mechanics of materials properties. “Fly as is” decisions aside, 
strict adherence to the precedence of the systems engineering requirements allocation, 
hctional analysis and verification processes will guide the conduct of ET program 
execution. Separately, waivers and deviations from these known engineering standards 
can be processed at the element integration level. ET must verify by positive, combined 
environmental testing or flight experience that minimum foam debris loss standards can 
be met. Absent this positive proof, other risk reduction techniques, assessments by 
analysis (justification must be made for depending solely on Monte Carlo analysis and 
data generated from low resolution photographs), contingency plans and programmatic 
mission needs may provide sufficient flight rationale. However, the true state of the ET 
subsystem must be clearly presented to decision makers at Flight Readiness Reviews 
(FRR), Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR) and ultimate Independent Technical 
Authority (ITA) decision level. Estimation techniques applied to poor quality 
photographs to derive data can lead to error propagation in large programs such as 
Shuttle. Data integrity is paramount in preventing misuse and the resultant poor 
decisions. Review of Powerpoint charts presented to the ITA decision making authority 
for STS 114 (Discovery) highlights the dangers of such error propagation. The true 
debris generation state of the ET and its verified compliance with requirements was not 
fully disclosed. More importantly, requirement waivers were not known to have been 
generated. STS-121 by contrast was a major improvement, but data integrity issues still 
evident. 
Short term solutions include a series of further debris reduction activities as follows: 
Exhaustive NDE, testing and reapplication of foam in protuberance influenced 
regions for delivered tanks. Execute waivers on any tanks determined suitable 
for flight rationale for any foams and/or tank regions not validated by 
statistically significant combined environments testing and comprehensive 
NDE results. 
Redesign Ice Frost Ramps (IFR’s) (including eliminatiodreduction of TPS), 
protuberance influenced insulation material, NDE and testing of delivered 
tanks. Execute waivers on any tanks determined suitable for flight rationale 
for any foams and/or tank regions not validated by statistically significant 
combined environments testing and comprehensive NDE results. 
Remove and replace all low probability PONEA (Probability of Not 
Exceeding Allowable) location foam on delivered tanks. Execute waivers on 
any tanks determined suitable for flight rationale for any foams and/or tank 
4) 
regions not validated by statistically significant combined environments 
testing and comprehensive NDE results. 
Use “As is.” Limit risk to loss of life by flying with significantly reduced 
crew and full consideration of contingency operations. Execute waivers on 
any tanks determined suitable for flight rationale for any foams andor tank 
regions not validated by statistically significant combined environments 
testing and comprehensive NDE results. 
Based on literature and past experience, long term solutions should include the full gamut 
of development activities to ensure structural integrity of foam in meeting debris loss 
limitations as follows: 
1) Coatings - Paint, membranes and other high heat resistant barriers that can 
maintain the aerodynamic surface during the first few minutes of flight. 
2) Fiber Reinforcements - This will include building on the current body of 
knowledge on polyurethane foams to optimize a formulation with high heat 
resistance and higher strength. Fiber reinforced foams offer a very high 
promise of being able to increase strength and further researchldevelopment is 
necessary! 
3) Combination Systems - Each of the new foam formulations and coatings need 
not only be examined separately in meeting requirements, but in combination 
with one another. 
IV. Requirements 
The primary requirements limiting debris generation are documented in NSTS and other 
internal NASA documents. These prescriptions include great detail on location and 
allowable debris size. The author prefers a conservative zero defects approach in 
defining a program that will be based on the highest probability of success. High 
expectations are not unreasonable given the nature of this problem. This necessarily 
creates “derived” requirements of “no debris generation” in a comprehensive external 
tank foam debris reduction project. 
The root causation “erosion” due to aerodynamic heating and viscous forces is 
fimdamental in defect free and defective foam alike. Naturally, defective foam areas 
have higher probability of release. There are basically four primary defects; 1) Bondline 
Delamination, 2) Low Material Properties (e.g., Bond Adhesion, Cohesive failure), 3) 
Threshold Voids and 4) Cracking. All four defects can be eliminated from a mission 
through comprehensive NDE, materials quality control andor materials improvement 
initiatives. Inability to manufacture a TPS free of these defects introduces an 
unnecessary delta pressure and cryopumping mechanism possibly contributing to the 
primary aeroheating/loads causation for potential foam loss depending on size and 
location. 
The large volume between the LO2 tank and the LH2 tank is covered by the “intertank 
flange”, a structural section of the tank enclosing the interstitial volume between the top 
dome of the LH2 tank, and the bottom dome of the LO2 tank. Prior to launch, this 
volume is on a continual purge with nitrogen, to eliminate oxygen from the volume. 
During tanking, the liquid hydrogen tank is at -423°F. At this temperature, nitrogen 
condensation can form on the top dome of the LH2 tank, and drain down to the LH2 
tanklintertank flange interface. Because of the design, there are potential leak paths for 
this liquid to the exterior, or foam side of the structure. If voids are present at the foam 
structure interface, the liquid can fill the void. This phenomenon is known as “Cryo- 
ingestion”. On ascent, external aerodynamic heating can cause subsequent sublimation 
and hence foam release at that interface. Cryo-ingestion is a threat only at the LH2 
intertank flange region of the ET. The larger acreage of the tank is not susceptible since 
the liquefied nitrogen condenses on the top dome of the LH2 tank and runs down to the 
intertank flange interface. Only voids in this immediate area are susceptible to cryo- 
ingestion. The ET tank foam is closed-cell foam, so liquids will not pass through the 
foam unless other leak paths are present, and cryo-ingestion can only occur if liquid can 
transfer into the void. Manufacturing and processing controls have been put in place to 
improve the intertank flange closeout, and minimize flaws and flaw sizes in the ET foam. 
There is another potential source of cryogenic problem specific to the LH2 tank known as 
“cryo-pumping”. The extremely cold temperatures of the hydrogen tank also bring about 
this phenomenon. If a flaw in the foam is sufficiently close enough to the tank surface to 
reach -423”F, the atmosphere trapped in the foam void will liquefy. If there is also a 
“leak-path” from the atmosphere to this void, the liquefaction occurring inside the void 
causes the air pressure in the void to drop and draw in more air through the leak path. 
This process continues until the void is full of liquefied atmosphere. On ascent, heating 
causes the liquefied air to change state to gas, and pressurize the void. If this heating 
occurs at a rate sufficiently fast that the leak-path cannot vent the gas, foam loss can 
occur, with foam structural failure likely initiating along the leak path. Cryo-pumping 
represents a threat that exists across a large acreage of the top of the LH2 tank, but will 
only occur if voids reach critical temperatures, and have leak-paths to the atmosphere. 
Further, as the distance below the intertank flange increases, ascent heating decreases. 
Thus, at some point below the intertank flange, the threat from cryo-pumping ceases. 
The timeframe of concern is very limited in the case of Shuttle due to loss of atmosphere 
with gain in altitude (debris) and the cryogens contained in the ET are not needed on- 
orbit (thermal function). Aerodynamic Sensitive Transport Time (ASTT) is the period 
from liftoff (T-0) to approximately T-t-136 seconds when the vehicle is at about 180,000 
ft. in altitude and traveling at about Mach 4.2 (See Figure 2) depending on many 
variables. At this altitude, the transport mechanisms creating a debris hazard have 
dissipated. The Ares CLV US TPS will need to perform functionally (e.g., maintain 
minimum thermal properties) on-orbit for periods of time possibly in excess of 90 days. 
At these higher altitudes, “pop-corning” of TPS is typically comprised of small pieces of 
foam liberated due to the less than threshold value voids reacting to a more extreme 
“vacuum” environment. 
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Figure 2 
Root causation erosion can be intensified depending on flight profiles as recently shown 
on STS- 12 1 analysis. Trajectory, aeroheating and LH2 Liquid Level indications are that 
a STS-121 High Q mission design may have caused earlier foam loss, additional foam 
loss and more damage if impacts occurred (See Figure 2).28 Additionally, this same 
analysis correlates log transformed “estimated” mass losses to maximum dynamic 
pressure (MaxQ) for IFR acreage combined losses (void-delta P, cryopumping and 
aerodynamic not singled out based on photographic image data). The report describes the 
increasing mass to MaxQ trend line as significant. Although the report emphasizes the 
author’s concern with utilizing poor quality 2-D photographs to generate 3-D “data,” it is 
important to note that “there is no meaningful correlation” with such historically 
“generated” data and the three key factors of void-delta P, cryopumping and aerodynamic 
effects. It seems unlikely that aerodynamic effects would not correlate well with MaxQ 
and skepticism of the historically generated photograph data increases especially with 
regards to “root cause” designation. This author believes that such healthy skepticism 
has finally arrived within the Shuttle Program Office and future testing will bring “root 
cause,” as-designed, as-built and defective materials into their proper perspective. The 
important take-away or lesson learned fiom this complex failure mode analysis is that 
strength of materials and loads environment are paramount for root causation. When 
actual stress becomes greater than material allowable failure occurs. “Structures” such as 
TPS designed without statistically relevant positive margins can and will fail. Where, 
when and how depends on which part of the equation becomes apparent first. 
Absent location specific flight stress/strain/temperature data on the ET and “A-basis” 
materials data, the significance of any materials improvements needed will remain not 
quantified. As reported by Kraus’, flight sensor data must be carefully scrutinized when 
approaching physical margins. The multiple non-linear analyses required to operate 
vehicle structural systems at these razor thin margins is unproven and adds further 
credence to a positive margin “no debris” requirements philosophy. Stuckey in 1996 
reported that at 0.0 178 idin strain to failure of tested NCFI 24- 124 (current acreage 
foam) that this level was unimportant as “the ET does not see strains to this level*.” This 
suggests the magnitude of foam materials improvements is a fractional rather than 
multiple measure. Regardless, proceeding with a debris reduction project without such 
location specific quantification of worst case environments especially elevated 
temperaturehtrain is a mild risk. Other requirements risks especially for short term tasks 
include the absence of actual location specific data to substantiate early stage foam loss 
failure modes possibly resulting in incomplete NDE. However, the phased approach to 
the program and a conservative requirements philosophy will allow such parallel analyses 
and a wide range of performance enhancements to be implemented over time mirroring 
current national policy and agency strategy. 
The argument that schedule and qualification requirements preclude new foam 
formulations is not based on fact. Several foam materials improvement projects and ET 
design changes have been initiated in the past resulting in successful flight integration 
within 2 years. The PAL ramp “redesign” was qualified in just six months for flight on 
STS-121. A comprehensive foam refinement project may result in a series of 
improvements over the next 4 years. An innovative industry wide competition may 
produce results in 12 months. At the beginning of the first RTF, the same programmatic 
logic was used and 2-1/2 years later we are still struggling for answers. The zero defects 
charter is the only practical approach to establishing a successful debris reduction project. 
It is precisely these margins that have never before existed for ET foam and it will be the 
quest of such margins that brings significant reduction in ET debris generation. 
V. Materials Improvement Initiatives 
This paper highlights longer term materials improvement initiatives for addressing root 
cause as previously discussed in the background material. This philosophy accepts the 
variability of the materials and processes as they are and establishes statistically 
significant positive margins to meet requirements. However, the current short term ET 
NDE developments and materials quality control efforts must incorporate relevant key 
findings/results of materials improvement initiatives. For example, recent research 
indicates that non-uniformity of cell shape in closed cell cellular solids decreases bulk 
Young’s modulus and shear modulus.6 New NDE techniques might need to be developed 
should it be determined that sensitivity to cell shape or size becomes an important means 
of assessing foam condition and flight readiness. The agehhelf life of completed tanks 
and raw materials is another critical characteristic that may be reassessed after key 
findings/results and change constraints for flight. The materials improvement initiatives 
should be viewed as integral to a successful short term strategy and not in competition. 
Materials improvement initiatives should fall under two broad and overlapping 
categories; 1) existing foam characterizations & improvements and 2) new foam system 
formulations. 
Existing foam characterizations & improvements - The raw materials of ET’S 
polyurethane/polyisocyanurate foam system depends heavily on the supplier, the 
materials lot or batch, storage/inventory/shipping history and real time mixing data. 
Detailed chemical analyses are necessary to establish a baseline and to affect mandatory 
inspection points (MIP) for quality control. The first step in this process will be the 
collection of all subcomponent materials data sheets, acceptance testing, inventory & 
shipping records and other pertinent information necessary to create a track record from 
raw stockpiles, supplier packaging & storage and shipment/acceptance/inventory at MAF 
or other spray facilities. Independent chemical sampling and evaluation will baseline a 
chemical profile for all supplier materials through the use of High Performance Liquid 
Chromatography (HPLC), Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR), Fourier 
Transform 13C Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (FT-NMR) and other appropriate techniques 
to fully quantify raw materials constituent make-up including identification of 
contaminants. The raw materials are received as part “A” and “B” components. Part A is 
a mixture of isocyanates with predominantly diphenylmethane-diisocyanate (MDI) and 
Part B is the poly01 component primarily of polyols, catalysts (amines & tin based), fire 
retardants (Fyrol, Dow & others), blowing agents (freons, CFC’s & HCFC’s) and various 
other unidentified elements. Analysis of these components in the past has produced a 
wide variance of proportional contribution to the delivered material.2y lo. The physical 
properties of the final foam material are directly related to the exact chemical proportion 
of the raw materials, process and environment as emphasized in all research to date. 
Quality control sampling must be event driven and/or sufficient bonded storage/handling 
controls in place. 
Secondly, cured foam must be analyzed in an equally comprehensive manner to assure 
that not just through thickness chemical constituents meet functional requirements (e.g., 
FTIR), but density, thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), differential thermogravimetric 
analysis (dTGA), flame retardancy tests, combined environmental tests, mechanical tests, 
cryoflex testing, average cell wall thicknesses and possibly cell wall shape uniformity 
measurements. Witness samples, photographic surveillance, W monitoring and other 
verification techniques need to be assessed against the baseline. These steps when 
combined with a thorough statistical process control philosophy will establish the 
baseline from which improvements are obtained. 
Foam improvement methodologies will be immediately recognized through the strict 
process controls previously described and currently being implemented by the ET Project 
Office. A careful design of experiments approach including all variables in the current 
process, raw materials proportioning, mix ratios, substrate preparation and environment 
with specific attention to the respective change matrix sensitivities to strength, thermal, 
heat recession and other physical properties will result in a range of improvement 
solutions. These improvements can be immediately introduced on the flight vehicle in 
locations without strict debris requirements for flight validation. 
New Foam System Formulations - In previous foam formulation efforts conducted by 
NASA, researchers were successful in identifying industry available foam formulations 
meeting Shuttle requirements with some physical attributes exceeding existing foam 
performance.2 For instance, a BASF Pluracol975 & Mondur MR w/catalyst formulation 
showed only 3.30% weight loss by TGA at 300°C versus the NCFI-22-65 (precursor 
foam to NCFI 24-57 currently used on ET aft dome) weight loss of 13.85%. At 600°C, a 
Stepan Chemical Stepanol PS 3 152 & Mondur MR formulation showed 62.95% versus 
the NCFI product’s 95.50% weight loss by TGA.2 There may very well exist current 
“off-the-shelf’ foam systems that can be qualified for ET that outperform the existing 
foam systems as was the case in this specific instance in the late 1980’s. However, a 
comprehensive industry wide search and screening must take place to identify viable 
candidates. Attention to research methods previously deployed and documented can 
drastically shorten the cycle for such screenings. Also, the author has suggested to the 
MSFC Shuttle Program Office that a contest or BAA be announced to spray foam 
manufacturers soliciting new foam formulations with a greater performance attribute. 
Other long term solutions are necessary to begin in parallel to serve as “off ramps” or risk 
reduction activities should the performance of improvements and new foam formulations 
not provide the requisite debris reduction results in flight. These include coatings for 
surface stabilization, fiber reinforcements and combination systems. 
Coatings - Paint, membranes and other high heat resistant barriers that can maintain the 
aerodynamic surface during the first few minutes of flight. These coatings must 
necessarily be highly compatible with the isocyanurate/polyurethane foams. A paint 
membrane was flown on the first ET on STS- 1, but subsequently eliminated. Recent 
advances in polymer science may facilitate a “conversion” type top layer of foam of a 
higher density and, subsequently, higher modulus than the parent material. These 
tenacious type coatings with high heat resistance and high strength will necessarily 
require a full verification process under combined environmental loadings. 
Fiber Reinforcements - This will include building on the current body of knowledge on 
polyurethane foams to optimize a formulation with high heat resistance and higher 
strength. Fiber reinforced foams offer a very high promise of being able to increase 
strength and further researchldevelopment is nece~sary.~ Some embryonic unfunded 
initiatives have begun to address this issue through an agreement with DuPont to exploit 
KevlarB as a reinforcing fiber. The team has successfully integrated these fibers into a 
hand-spray version of Part B poly01 (Arc0 Chemical Co., Thanol R-35OX) and produced 
foam samples. Additional funding might help add the strict controls surrounding raw 
materials handling, fiber mixing, sample preparation, mix ratios and environmental 
constraints so important to quantifjmg this fiber integration. Future work should 
necessarily include strict process controls and data recording, sensitivity studies on fiber 
content and rise rates, volume fiaction and chemical make-up. Also, alternate polyols 
with lower viscosity values may improve the fiber mixing process eliminating the need to 
add volatile solubles. These fiber reinforcement solutions build on the foam 
improvements and new formulations offered in parallel and are more readily flight 
qualified by similarity. 
Combination Systems - Each of the new fiber reinforcement foam formulations and 
coatings need not only be examined separately in meeting requirements, but in 
combination with one another. Such combination systems can leverage the entire 
materials improvement initiatives to realize true zero debris generation. 
VI. Summary 
We cannot afford to be defeated by the challenge placed before NASA. The 
development of more superior spray-on foam insulation is not a Shuttle specific issue. 
This materials development challenge can provide the environment to deliver 
technologies needed throughout the current NASA exploration mission such as insulation 
systems needed on the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), 
lunar building blocks, inflatable structures and upper stages. Additionally, it may prove 
invaluable in an unexpected extension of Shuttle utilization should NASA not deliver on 
its latest architecture in a timely fashion. Compare any of the currently NASA funded 
technologies against this critical materials improvement initiative and one finds these 
initiatives rank much higher in priority across the full spectrum of NASA enterprises. 
Our leadership must and will rise up to do the heavy lifting of engineering excellence. 
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